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Michael Arbib’s Metaphorical Bruin 2 has doubled the size of the initial volume (from 
243 to 458 pages) and altered its character substantially. The change has been from a truly 
metaphorical book to one that has a great deal to say about the actual biological brain. 
Arbib indicates that the reason for this (aside from his own developing interests) is that the 
human brain operates, to a large extent, on what he calls “virtual reality”. This is due to the 
top-down operations of cognitive processes based on memory. Thus the brain’s operations 
become per se metaphorical when viewed from the standpoint of scientific realism. 
The earlier Metaphorical Brain was mostly about engineering models of brain function 
in the tradition of cybernetics. The current volume continues to pursue this tradition which 
has blossomed during the intervening 17 years, especially with the advent of programming 
architectures called neural networks or parallel distributed processes (PDP). The result is a 
reference work of inestimable value. Arbib takes real world problems such as locomotion, 
visuomotor coordination, and learning, analyzes them in terms of engineering concepts, 
and provides relevant evidence from the neurosciences whenever possible. 
Less satisfactory from the neurological perspective is the organization of the themes 
that unify the book. Beginning with the section on Schema Theory (p. 204) we are shuttled 
from frogs to Shepard figures and machine vision and shortly thereafter to human language. 
Arbib uses these various topics as examples of the importance of a certain type of internal 
representation which he calls schemas. This concept, used extensively by Henry Head and 
by Sir Frederick Bartlett, is meant to give unity to the exposition. A schema, Arbib holds, 
is much like a program in that it has many different instantiations. On p. 207 the attributes 
of schemas are listed. I interpret these as defining distributed map-like structures which 
can be cascaded in a variety of combinations during processing. In a sense they are a more 
sophisticated version of cell assemblies (such as those proposed by Donald Hebb [ 131) 
which partake of the property that any particular neuron or schema can participate in a 
variety of processes by being coupled to a variety of other assemblies or schemas. 
‘- Wiley-Interscience, New York, 1989. 
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My problem is not with the concept of schema per se but with separating this section 
from discussions in Part III of vision, action and memory. In Part III one loses sight of 
schemas and thus of the putative coordinating theme of the volume. Also, or perhaps 
therefore, this part of the book seems to be arbitrary in its choice of models and 
neurological data. What is presented is valuable but seems to reflect accepted dogma in 
the neurosciences (as Horace Barlow [l] has called it) rather than a broader perspective of 
metaphors and their instantiation and substantiation in the neuroscience laboratory. 
What I miss most, of course, is a follow-through on what in the earlier book was 
entitled “The Hologram Metaphor” to which Arbib devoted a section of six pages. In The 
Metaphorical Bruin 2 he dismisses this particular metaphor with the following paragraph: 
. . we must note that the Cambridge school of psychophysics (see [6] for an early 
review of their work) has psychophysical data showing that the visual cortex has cells 
that respond not so much to edges as to bars of a particular width or gratings of a 
certain spatial frequency. The cells of the visual cortex tuned for spatial frequency can 
be seen as falling into different channels depending on their spatial tuning. This might 
seem to support the contention that the brain extracts a spatial Fourier transform of the 
visual image, and then uses this for holographic storage or for position independent 
recognition [22]. However there is no evidence that the neural system has either 
the fine discrimination of spatial frequencies or the preservation of spatial phase 
information needed for such Fourier transformations to be computed with sufficient 
accuracy to be useful. However, optical computing and holographic techniques may 
have an important role to play in machine vision. At present, there is little integration 
of optical and electronic computing, but in the future we may see machines built to 
conduct a number of low-level visual processes through optical computing, interfaced 
into electronic computers for the distributed, decision-making computing involved in 
high-level vision. (pp. 134-135) 
This paragraph illuminates what can go wrong when one reports only what one reads 
and has no direct experience at the neurophysiological bench. Whether one agrees with the 
work that is related to the holographic metaphor or not, if a book is called The Metaphorical 
Bruin it is at least necessary to acknowledge the immense amount of work that has been 
done in this domain of investigation. Much of this work is summarized in the excellent 
volume by DeValois et al. entitled Spatial V&ion and published in 1988 [8]. Two decades 
of psychophysical and neurophysiological experiments were performed not only by the 
Cambridge group under Fergus Campbell, but also in St. Petersburg (then Leningrad) by 
Vladimir Glazer, by DeValois and DeValois at the University of California at Berkeley, 
by Peter Bishop’s group in Canberra, Australia, by Daniel Pollen at the University of 
Massachusetts, as well as by my own group at Stanford. 
Arbib’s paragraph is remiss in many details. He notes that Campbell has “psychophys- 
ical data showing that the visual cortex has cells that respond . . .“. Psychophysics deals 
with the relation between psychology as expressed in a subject’s verbal or instrumental re- 
sponse and the physical description of a stimulating event. Responses of cells in the visual 
cortex are neurophysiological in character, not psychophysical. This disregard for levels 
of processing is endemic in The Metaphorical Brain 2 and I will return to it below, for I 
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believe it accounts for Arbib’s inability to deal with the models that have developed from 
the holographic metaphor. 
“ . . the visual cortex has cells that respond not so much to edges as to bars of a particular 
width or gratings of a particular spatial frequency.” DeValois has shown that visual cortex 
receptive fields are tuned to l/2 to 1 octave of spatial frequency, not to bar width. The 
response remains flat as a bar’s width is broadened even to several degrees of visual angle. 
“. . . however there is no evidence that the neural system has either the fine discrimination 
of spatial frequencies or the preservation of spatial phase information needed for such 
Fourier transformations to be useful.” As has been repeatedly pointed out in the vision 
research community, the visual channels for color are also broadly tuned, still we make 
a myriad of fine color discriminations. As to phase, Pollen and Ronner [ 191 have shown 
quadrature (a shift of 90 degrees) between adjacent cells in a cortical column of the visual 
system. 
Also, why not give credit to the holographic metaphor for being one of the critical 
factors (together with Selfridge’s Pandemonium, and Rosenblatt’s Perceptions) helping to 
give birth to the PDP neural networks enterprise? David Willshaw reviews (in Hinton and 
Anderson’s 1981 book [15] which inaugurated PDP) the fact that his thesis and subsequent 
work with Buneman and Longuet-Higgins was inspired by holography. This work was 
already quoted in the chapter on Neural Holograms in my Languages @the Brain [22]. 
And, what about tomography and optical-type image processing which is now standard 
procedure in hospital practice? (See review by Bracewell [4].) 
Most important, however, is the fact that the holographic metaphor has developed into 
a precisely stated mathematical “holonomic” brain theory based on the finding that Gabor 
elementary functions accurately describe the receptive field properties of visual cortical 
neurons. A Gabor function is a sinusoid (as in a Fourier transform) bounded by a Gaussian 
envelope. Gabor devised these functions to determine the maximum efficiency with which 
a telephone communication could be transmitted across the Atlantic Cable. He called such 
functions quanta of information because they are mathematically identical to quanta in 
microphysics as described by Heisenberg. A whole new level of neural processing and a 
new dimension of PDP neural network computing has developed from these neuroscience 
laboratory and engineering discoveries (for review see [22,23]. 
Why, with exception of the development of PDP neural networks, does Arbib hew to the 
received dogma so slavishly as to exclude the work that has developed from the holographic 
metaphor? There must be some clear intellectual basis for this exclusion. 
The basis can be found by referring to Fig. 2.3.9 on p. 59 of The Metaphorical Bruin 2. 
Three separate magnifications of cerebellar cortex are shown. The first represents a low 
magnification cross section of cortex demonstrating “a few of the [overlapping] cellular 
components therein”. The next is a larger magnification showing the profuse dendritic 
arborization of one of these cellular components, a Purkinje cell. These arborizations are 
“contacted by one climbing fiber, up to 200 000 parallel fibers, and numerous axons from 
other cell types within the cerebellum.” The final picture is a magnification which shows “a 
portion of one of the finest dendritic branches of the Purkinje cell. Off this branch we can 
see seven synaptic spines . . . protruding to make contact with passing parallel fibers.” This 
magnification is displayed in such a way that one can readily imagine the neurochemical 
field effects that must be operating as processing takes place. 
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Much of the community of neuroscientists that uses microelectrodes operates at the 
cellular level and their conceptualization to center on this level. By contrast, it is at the level 
of processing and where dendrites with their microtubular cytoskeleton, and the spines 
reaching into oligodendroglia surrounds, that the holographic and holonomic metaphors 
take root. It is at the synaptodendritic level that neural computation occurs. The neuron is 
not the unit of processing. The synapse is. Sherrington knew this. Eccles knew this and 
labeled the functional synaptodendritic processing unit a dendron. Even the McCulloch- 
Pitts scheme has been misinterpreted by the neuroscience and PDP community: About a 
month before McCulloch died, we discussed this matter. McCulloch pointed to the dense 
feltwork of dendrites that tops the picture of his neurons like a head of hair. “That’s where 
your holographic process is taking place. Yes?” 
Most likely, our inability to track processes precisely at this level of magnification has 
contributed to the current dogma. After all it is easier to look under the lamp post than in 
the hazy dark beyond. But simulations of processes based on what has been measured have 
been made by Shepherd and his group at Yale University and by Perkel and his group at 
the University of California at Irvine (see 122, Lecture 41 for review). These simulations 
deserve a hearing as much as the many others reviewed in The Metaphorical Bruin 2. 
A brief review of the path of holography from metaphor to models is in order. The 
limitations of understanding the interference pattern model began to yield to further inquiry 
with the advent of optical holography. This invention made it possible to specify how 
interference patterns could account for image (re)construction and for the distributed nature 
of the memory store [ 14,16,21,22,24]. A holographic hypothesis of brain function in 
perception was developed into a precise computational model of brain function on the 
basis of the mathematics that had made holography possible (see e.g., The Cortex as 
InteqGerometer by Barrett [2], The Holographic Hypothesis of Brain Function in Perception 
and Memory by Pribram, Nuwer and Baron [ 171). The computational promise and firm 
neurophysiological base of this model was perceived by many scientists as a starting 
point for what has become the “connectionist” parallel-distributed processing approach 
to modeling brain function in perception and learning (e.g., Anderson and Hinton and 
Willshaw both in [ 151). 
Despite this acknowledgment of promise, objections, some more precisely stated than 
others, were raised regarding the holographic model. Certain initial objections were based 
on an incorrect analogy between the paraphernalia of early optical information processing 
techniques (such as coherent reference beams) though these were shown very early on to 
be unnecessary [ 17, IS]. Other objections derived from a misidentification of the “waves” 
involved in holography as somehow representative of the brain waves recorded from the 
scalp. Macroscopic waves cannot possibly carry the amount of information necessary to 
account for the processing requirements involved in perception. On the other hand, spatial 
interactions among junctional microprocesses occurring in dendritic networks can provide 
the basis for extremely complex processing [22, Chapter 81. 
A more germane objection came from the fact that the mathematics involved in holog- 
raphy as developed by Gabor [ 121, centered on the Fourier theorem. In psychophysics, 
therefore, it was sometimes held that the transfer function computed by the sensory system 
was a global Fourier transform, thus spreading the input over large extents of cortex. This 
was shown to be an untenable position for psychophysics [5]. However, the neurophysiol- 
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ogists who had initially formulated the hypothesis with regard to brain function had always 
noted that the transfer functions involved are limited to particular receptive fields and that 
more complex relations determine processing of ensembles of such fields [7,17,2 1,251. 
However, the fundamental difficulty for understanding has to do with the nature of the 
Fourier relation itself. The Fourier theorem holds that any pattern can be analyzed into a 
set of regular, periodic oscillations differing only in frequency, amplitude, and phase. The 
Fourier transform of such a pattern is described as a spectrum composed of coefficients 
representing the amplitudes of the intersection (quadrature) of sine and cosine components 
of the various frequencies present in the pattern. The medium of optical holography, 
the silver grains of the photographic film, encodes these coefficients. The effects of 
reinforcement and occlusion at the intersections among wave fronts are encoded, not the 
wave fronts themselves. The sites of intersection form nodes of the complex conjugate of 
varying amplitude, which are represented numerically by Fourier coefficients. A rainbow 
displays a spectrum of colors diffracted by discrete drops of moisture-the wave forms that 
compose the display are not seen as such. Thus, the holographic model of brain function 
had to be described in terms of a complex spectral representation. Often description 
was erroneously made solely in terms of wave forms per se; sometimes, because of its 
counterintuitive nature, the spectral representation was discounted. 
Much of the confusion was due to confounding two dualities: a wave versus particle 
duality, on the one hand, with a space-time versus energy-momentum duality on the 
other. The Fourier transformation expresses only the space-time versus energy-momentum 
duality. The wave versus particle duality is expressed by the observation that particles in 
motion within a medium create waves (see [3]). 
Holographic theory is based solely on the “either-or” Fourier duality between space-time 
and spectrum. The holonomic brain theory incorporates this duality but is additionally 
based on the delineation by Gabor of a “phase space” in which the complex of space- 
time and spectrum become embedded. In such a phase space, space time considerations 
constrain an essentially spectral computation. It is in this complex coordinate space that 
the least action principle is applied. 
Dirac [9] introduced a concept, extended by Feynman [lo], which is used in the 
holonomic brain theory to relate these two dualities to one another. The concept is called 
the least action principle. This is an optimization principle. It claims that the path of a 
particle will tend toward the least expenditure of energy. This occurs because energy and 
momentum are conserved in any physical interaction (the conservation laws). 
The hoionomic brain theory thus aims to go beyond the earlier formulations of the 
holographic hypothesis and to extend the scope of computability. The term holonomic 
was chosen to distinguish it from holographic and still connote that it is holistic and lawful 
(Webster’s 3rd International Dictionary defines holo as whole; nomic as having the general 
force of natural law, i.e., is generally valid). In mathematics the term holonomic was first 
used by Hertz. As such it referred to structural constraints by which a set of original 
coordinates can be expressed by more generalized (Lagrangian) coordinates. In this usage 
the term was applied only to space (and time) coordinates. Here usage is extended to 
include the spectral domain (which as noted is the Fourier transform of space-time). In 
contrast to a purely holographic theory, therefore, the inclusion of space-time coordinates 
in the holonomic theory incorporates the operation of structural constraints in processing. 
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The formal, mathematical foundations of the computations contributing to the holo- 
nomic brain theory rest on four fundamental concepts and the relations between them. 
Only one of these basic conceptions is familiar-that of space-time, and even here, only 
in the 20th century has it been formally realized that space and time are intimately related 
through movement. The second basic conception is a generalization of the application of 
the concept of a spectral domain: Not only colors and tones can be analyzed into their 
component frequencies of oscillation. Processing of all exteroceptive sensations includ- 
ing those dependent on spatiotemporal configurations (such as the shapes of surfaces and 
forms) can be understood as amplitude modulations of these oscillations. As noted, it is 
this spectral aspect of processing that was the foundation of the holographic hypothesis 
of brain function in perception. In the case of surfaces and forms this aspect is described 
in terms of spatial frequencies of oscillation. In fact, due to the Fourier transformation, 
spectra enfold the ordinary conception of both space and time. 
A third concept derives from plotting spectral and space-time values within the same 
frame. It turns out that when this is done, there is a limit with which both frequency 
and space-time can be concurrently determined in any measurement. This uncertainty 
describes a fundamental minimum defined by Gabor [l 11 as a quantum of information. 
This minimum is a sinusoid variably constrained by space-time coordinates and thus 
differs from the unit of information defined by Shannon, usually taken as a bit (a 
binary digit), a Boolean choice between alternatives [26]. However, Shannon also defined 
information as a reduction of uncertainty. This uncertainty relationship provides a link 
between Gabor’s and Shannon’s definitions and allows for an explicit convergence 
of information processing theories. Furthermore, the distinction between Gabor’s and 
Shannon’s formulations provides the basis of the distinction between the configural and 
the cognitive aspects of perception. 
The fourth concept basic to the holonomic (which has also been called quantum 
holographic) brain theory emphasizes the manner in which optimization is achieved in 
perception. Dendritic microprocessing is conceived to take advantage of the uncertainty 
relation to attain optimal information processing. The holonomic brain theory concerns 
the efficiency with which processing proceeds-efficiency based on spectral resolution 
obtained by sharpening the tuning of receptive field properties. More needs to be 
accomplished in demonstrating phase encoding in cortex and how such encoding enhances 
perceptual differentiation. 
But enough of this in-depth critique. As can be seen from my long review, delving into 
one aspect of Arbib’s The Metaphorical Brain 2 the volume is most worthwhile reading 
and having in one’s library. Almost every page has paragraphs that can stimulate in-depth 
discussion such as I have undertaken here. I have chosen to concentrate on one such topic 
which is fully developed in my book, Brain and Perception, Holonomy and Structure in 
Figural Processing [20]. 
Transdisciplinary work such as I have engaged in and as Arbib has developed here takes 
courage: those who have spent their lives learning more and more about less and less can 
always find minor technical errors in the work of those who are trying to put things together. 
Arbib has managed to be technically competent in the areas he has covered and has given 
them lively coverage. He is to be congratulated. 
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